Abstract: Following the Stern review of climate change the numerical choice of the social discount rate has been identified as one of the most crucial determinants of optimal policy recommendations for greenhouse gas mitigation policies. In this paper I point out two closely related contributions to the social discount rate in an uncertain world that have been overlooked in the debate. First, the standard model that has been employed in the debate contains an implicit assumption of (intertemporal) risk neutrality, stemming from the assumption that Arrow Pratt risk aversion is equivalent to the aversion to intertemporal consumption fluctuations. Second, the recent decision theoretic literature has developed various models that generalize the description of uncertainty in order to explain observed differences in the attitude with respect to risk versus ambiguous uncertainty. I show how these two extensions of the standard model modify the (certainty equivalent) social discount rate and point out that there is reason to believe that the additional contribution from intertemporal risk aversion is significantly larger than the term capturing risk in the social discount rate based on the standard model. JEL Codes: D61, D81, D90, H43, Q00, Q54
1 Introduction Stern's (2007) review of climate change implied a significantly quicker and stronger action for greenhouse gas mitigation than most of the integrated assessments previously carried out in the literature. The difference between the results was mostly attributed to Stern's (2007) choice of the social discount rate whose 'correct value' has been hotly debated with some of the arguments summarized in Nordhaus (2007) , Weitzman (2007b) and Weitzman (2007a) , and Dasgupta (2008b) . In the classical Ramsey (1928) formulation the social discount rate comprises pure time preference and a term that expresses the change in marginal consumption appreciation caused by a combination of growth and the propensity to smooth consumption over time. Another contribution arises from considering risk and Arrow Pratt risk aversion. Essentially, these are the contributions whose quantifications were so hotly debated.
1 I show that a further and significant contribution stems from acknowledging intertemporal risk aversion as well as from acknowledging ambiguity.
Time and uncertainty constitute an essential ingredient to many of the most challenging environmental economic problems. However, in their combination the two have been treated rather negligently in the literature. The discounted expected utility standard model (which is additive in time and uncertainty) implicitly sets Arrow Pratt risk aversion equal to the aversion to intertemporal consumption flucutations. In two recent working papers I have pointed out that this assumption is effectively an assumption of risk neutrality (Traeger 2007e, Traeger 2007c ). A precise difference between Arrow Pratt risk aversion and the (inverse of the) intertemporal elasticity of substitution is itself a measure of risk attitude that I tagged intertemporal risk attitude. Intertemporal risk aversion can be understood as an aversion to utility gains and losses (as opposed to consumption gains and losses).
2
After a presentation of the general model of intertemporal risk aversion, I derive the corresponding social discount rate in a simple two period setting with a stochastic growth rate. For this purpose I employ a special case of the model that has already been formulated by Epstein & Zin (1989) and 1 A different adjustment stems from limited substitutability between goods under unbalanced growth as it can prevail for produced versus environmental goods (Guesnerie 2004 , Hoel & Sterner 2007 , Traeger 2007d , Sterner & Persson 2008 .
2 This intuition holds for a representation framework where aggregation is additive over time and nonlinear over uncertainty. Here, the utility function captures the attitude with respect to time and consumption appreciation under certainty. Weil (1990) . Besides some analytical convenience, this generalized isoelastic version of the model has the advantage that several attempts have been made to estimate its parameters. In consequence, I can give estimates of the size of the derived term in the social discount rate that has been neglected in the debate.
A different strand of literature developing over the last two decades models uncertainty without assuming the existence of unique probability measures. In axiomatic terms, these models relax the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) (or Savage 1954) axioms. Facing problems of climate change, lost prospects from reduced biodiversity, or ecosystem changes caused by possible invasive species it has often been pointed out that uncertainties are likely to be different from standard notions of risk and that they are not captured appropriately by applying a unique probability distribution. Here, decision makers might not know the probability distribution (objective probabilities), nor trust a single subjective guess (subjective probabilistic belief). I adopt a recent model of ambiguity by Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji (2005) and Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji (2009) that distinguishes between risk and more general uncertainty by employing first and second order probabilities. A convenience of this model is its resemblance to the standard Bayesian model. However, the key difference is that Klibanoff et. al's model captures different degrees of aversion for risk and ambiguous uncertainty. I derive the contribution of ambiguity aversion to the social discount rate in a simple two period version of the model. Section 2 lays out the models of intertemporal risk averse decision making and decision making under ambiguity. Section 3 derives the social discount rates under intertemporal risk aversion and under ambiguity. Section 4 concludes.
Intertemporal Models of Risk Attitude & Ambiguity
It is well known that the intertemporally additive expected utility framework for modeling preferences implicitly assumes that a decision maker's aversion to risk coincides with his aversion to intertemporal fluctuations. Epstein & Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) derive an alternative setting in which these two a priori quite different characteristics of preference can be disentangled. This section presents a slightly more general framework framework introducing the concept of intertemporal risk aversion (Traeger 2007e, Traeger 2007c . The generalization permits a simple and intuitive derivation of the model and an enlightening axiomatic characterization of the type of risk aversion it can capture as opposed to the standard model. Subsequently, the section summarizes a recent intertemporal ambiguity model by Klibanoff, Marinacci & Mukerji (2006) that captures uncertainty in a more general way than by means of unique probability distributions.
An Intertemporal Model of Risk Attitude
The simplest framework to convey the message of this paper is the 'certain × uncertain' setting, two periods with uncertainty only in the future period. I denote first period consumption by x 1 ∈ X and uncertain second period consumption is represented by a probability measure p over X. 3 I will refer to the 'standard model' as the modeling framework where a decision maker evaluates utility separately for every period and for every state of the world and then sums it over states and over time
where β is the utility discount factor representing pure time preference. The curvature of u captures the decision maker's aversion to consumption fluctuations. Because the same utility function is used to aggregate over time and over risk, the decision maker's aversion to (certain) intertemporal fluctuations is the same as his aversion to risk fluctuations corresponding to different states of the world. A priori, however, risk aversion and the propensity to smooth consumption over time are two distinct concepts. The notion that in an atemporal setting risky scenarios can be evaluated in the form
is based on the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) axioms. Here, the curvature of u vNM captures risk aversion. For a single commodity setting, the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion RRA(
x attaches a numeric value to curvature and risk aversion. A similar set of axioms 4 provides additive separability of preference representations evaluating certain consumption paths. Adding stationarity to the evaluation makes the utility functions in the different periods coincide up to a discount factor β
In equation (3) the concavity of the utility function u int describes aversion to intertemporal consumption volatility. In a one commodity setting 5 this aversion to intertemporal volatility can be measured by means of the consumption elasticity of marginal utility η = −
x. The consumption elasticity of marginal utility is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Note that the measure η exactly corresponds to the Arrow Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, only in the context of periods rather than risk states. Instead of calling η an aversion measure to intertemporal volatility, it can also be characterized as a measure for a decision maker's propensity to smooth consumption over time.
The conceptual difference between the utility functions u vNM and u int was first disentangled by Selden (1978) for the 'certain × uncertain' setting adopted here. Epstein & Zin (1989) use a one commodity isoelastic version of Kreps & Porteus's (1978) to extend this idea to an infinite time horizon. Such an isoelastic extension requires a recursive evaluation in order to preserve time consistency. In Traeger (2007e) I extend this reasoning to a multicommodity setting with more general functional forms, derived from combining the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms with the assumption that certain consumption paths can be evaluated in the additively separable form (3). For the 'certain × uncertain' setting the derivation of the general model is particularly simple. As the derivation gives a good intuition of the model and the concepts used later in this paper I give a brief sketch. Let equation Wakker (1988) , Koopmans (1960) , Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky (1971) , Jaffray (1974a) , Jaffray (1974b) , Radner (1982) , and Fishburn (1992) for various axiomatizations of additive separability over time. Other than the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) axioms, these axioms allow for period specific utility functions (which would correspond to a state dependent utility model in the risk setting).
5 Kihlstrom & Mirman (1974) generalized the one commodity measure by Arrow Pratt to a multi-commodity setting. Here risk aversion becomes good-specific and corresponds to the concavity of the utility function along a variation of the particular commodity keeping the others constant. The same concept of a multi-dimensional measure could be applied to intertemporal substitutability.
(3) represent preferences over certain (two period) consumption paths. Let equation (2) represent preferences over second period lotteries. Define x p 2 as the second period certainty equivalent to the lottery p by requiring
Now use the certainty equivalent to extend the evaluation functional in equation (3) to a setting of uncertainty by defining
Taking the inverse of u vNM assumes a one dimensional setting. In general, it holds that u vNM is always a strictly monotonic transformation of u int (Traeger 2007e) .
6 Thus, defining f by
and obtain in combination with equation (3) and the definition u ≡ u int the representation
for the multi-commodity framework. In general, preferences represented by equation (5) cannot be represented by an evaluation function of the form
The definition u vNM = f • u int points out that f is a measure for the difference between aversion to intertemporal fluctuations (as characterized by u int in a one-commodity setting) and aversion to risk in the Arrow Pratt sense (as characterized by u vNM in a one-commodity setting). For example, f concave is equivalent to u vNM being a concave transformation of u int , which is a definition of u vNM being more concave than u int (Hardy, Littlewood & Polya 1964) . Thus, a concave function f gains an interpretation of representing a decision maker who is more Arrow Pratt risk averse than he is averse to intertemporal consumption fluctuations. It is insightful to give an axiomatic characterization of f that characterizes the function in a general multicommodity setting and on basis of consumption decisions rather than utility comparisons.
Characterizing Intertemporal Risk Attitude
This section gives an axiomatic characterization of the type of uncertainty that can only be captured in the model of equation (5) and not in the standard model. It turns out that the term reducing the social discount rate is proportional to the quantitative measures of this type of risk aversion. Moreover, I show that functionally this type of risk aversion is captured in the curvature of the function f . A general stationary and nonstationary axiomatic characterizations of f (respectively time dependent series f t , t∈1,...,T ) can be found in Traeger (2007c) respectively Traeger (2007e) . These axioms require at least two uncertain periods and are slightly more involved. Here, I give a simplified axiom for the 'certain × uncertain' setting which conveys the same intuition as the general axioms, but has to assume the absence of pure time preference. Let characterize preferences on X × P corresponding to representation (5) with β = 1. Then, I call the corresponding decision maker (weakly) 7 intertemporal risk averse, if and only if, for allx,
The premise in equation (6) states that a decision maker is indifferent between a certain constant consumption path delivering the same outcomex in both periods and another certain consumption path which delivers outcome x 1 in the first and outcome x 2 in the second period. For example, x 1 can be an inferior outcome with respect tox. Then x 2 would be a superior outcome with respect tox. On the right hand side of equation (6) the decision maker receivesx in the first period, independent of his choice. For the second period he has a choice between the certain outcomex or a lottery that returns with equal probability either the superior or the inferior outcome. The decision maker is called (weakly) intertemporal risk averse if he prefers the certain outcomex in the second period over the lottery. 8 A decision maker is defined as (weakly) intertemporal risk loving if the preference relation in equation (6) is replaced by . He is defined to be risk neutral if he is both, intertemporal risk loving and intertemporal risk averse (relation in equation (6) is replaced by ∼). The following proposition relates intertemporal risk aversion to the function f .
Proposition 1: Let preferences over X × P be represented by equation (5) with a continuous function u : X → IR and a strictly increasing and continuous function f : U → IR, where U = u(X) and β = 1. a) The corresponding decision maker is (weakly) intertemporal risk averse [loving] , if and only if, the function f is concave [convex] .
b) The corresponding decision maker is intertemporal risk neutral, if and only if, there exist a, b ∈ IR such that f (z) = az + b. An intertemporal risk neutral decision maker maker maximizes intertemporally additive expected utility (equation 1).
9
The proposition shows that intertemporal risk aversion as defined by equation (6) is captured in the curvature of the function f in representation (5). Thus, intertemporal risk aversion can as well be interpreted as risk aversion with respect to utility gains and losses. This interpretation is true if preferences are represented in the form where the aggregation over time (in every recursion) is additive, as is the case in the representation in this paper. 10 Then, utility expressed by u characterizes how much the decision maker likes a particular outcome x or a particular degenerate situation in the 8 Let me point out that the lottery on the right hand side of equation (6) will either make the decision maker better off or worse off than (x,x), while on the left hand side the decision maker knows that if he picks an inferior outcome for some period he certainly receives the superior outcome in the other.
Calling preferences satisfying equation (6) intertemporal risk averse is motivated by the facts that, first, the definition intrinsically builds on intertemporal trade-offs and, second, Normandin & St-Amour (1998, 268) make the point that the conventional Arrow Pratt measure of risk aversion is an atemporal concept.
9 Recasting the proposition for a strictly decreasing continuous function f : U → IR turns concavity in statement a) into convexity [and convexity into concavity]. Replacing the definition of intertemporal risk aversion by its strict version given in footnote 7 switches concavity to strict concavity in the statement.
10 See Traeger (2007e) how the same preferences can be represented by making uncertainty aggregation linear at the cost of incorporating a nonlinear aggregation over time.
future. If the decision maker is intertemporal risk averse, he dislikes taking risk with respect to gains and losses of such utility. Note that in difference to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, the function f is always one dimensional. Thus, measures of intertemporal risk aversion can be used as a commodity independent risk measure also in a multi-commodity setting.
11
Even more interestingly, the measures can be applied to contexts frequently met in environmental economics where impacts, e.g. on an ecosystem, do not have a natural cardinal scale (Traeger 2007e) . The measure of absolute intertemporal risk aversion is defined as
and the measure of relative intertemporal risk aversion as
The measure of absolute intertemporal risk aversion depends on the choice of unit for utility and the measure RIRA(z) depends on the choice of zero in the definition of the utility function u. This normalization dependence is the analog to e.g. the wealth level dependence of the Arrow Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
12 Note that positivity of the measures AIRA and RIRA defined above indicates intertemporal risk aversion independently of whether f is increasing and concave of decreasing and convex (see footnote 9). In both cases − f ′′ f ′ is positive. Measuring utility in negative units (like in the isoelastic case employed in section 3 where u = x ρ ρ < 0 for ρ < 0) makes z negative and, therefore, in defining the relative risk aversion measure the absolute of the variable z is needed (Traeger 2007b ).
Ambiguity Aversion
A different short-coming of the intertemporal expected utility standard model is its assumption that the uncertainty over tomorrow can be described by a 11 See Kihlstrom & Mirman (1974) for the complications that arise when trying to extend the Arrow Pratt risk measures to a multi-commodity setting.
12 I.e. in the standard model, the Arrow Pratt measure of relative risk aversion RRA(x) = u ′′ u ′ x depends on what is considered the x = 0 level. For example, whether or not breathing fresh air is part of consumption or whether or not human capital is part of wealth changes the Arrow Pratt coefficient. unique probability measure. In many real world applications where these probability distributions (or the 'risk') is unknown. The decision-theoretic literature has developed different concepts in order to capture these situations. One way to characterize non-risk uncertainty is by extending the concept of probabilities to a form of more general set function called capacities. These set functions weigh possible events but are not necessarily additive in the union of disjoint events. Because of this non-additivity, the measure integral aggregating probability weighted utility in the expected utility framework has to be replaced by the more general Choquet integral. Therefore, this approach to generalizing uncertainty description and evaluation is called Choquet expected utlity. A second approach taken in the literature is to define an evaluation functional that expresses beliefs in form of sets of probability distributions rather than unique probability distributions. The first and simplest such representation goes back to Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) . Here a decision maker evaluates a scenario by taking expected values with respect to every probability distribution deemed possible and then identifies the scenario with the minimal expected value in this set. 13 A more general representation of this type is given by Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004) , Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini (2006a) and, in an intertemporal framework Maccheroni, Marinacci & Rustichini (2006b) . There are several equivalence results between the Choquet approach and that of multiple priors as well as rank dependent utility theory where a decision maker uses distorted probabilities in an expected utility approach increasing the weights given to small probability events. Axiomatically, all of these models relax the independence axiom in one way or the other.
In this paper, I focus on a recent representation result by Klibanoff et al. (2005) , and, in an intertemporal setting Klibanoff et al. (2009) . The authors model non-risk uncertainty (ambiguity) as second order probability distributions that is, probabilities over probabilities. Moreover, they introduce a different attitude for evaluating first respectively second order uncertainty. Another way to think about the model is as a Bayesian model with parameter uncertainty. The difference from the standard Bayesian model is that parameter uncertainty (second order uncertainty) is evaluated with a different degree of aversion than the uncertainty arising from the probability distribution characterized by the parameter (first order uncertainty). Translated into the simplified setting of this paper, Klibanoff et al.'s (2005 Klibanoff et al.'s ( , 2009 ) (generally recursive) evaluation of the future can be written as
For a given parameter θ, the probability measure Π θ on X denotes first order or 'objective' probabilities. However, these are not known uniquely and depend on a parameter θ that is unknown and subjective. The probability measure µ denotes the prior over the parameter θ ∈ Θ.
14 The utility function u corresponds to the utility function of the standard model. It jointly captures aversion to intertemporal substitutability and 'objective' or first order risk. The function Φ captures additional aversion with respect to second order uncertainty which is called ambiguity aversion. Note that for Φ linear the model collapses to the standard Bayesian model. If the objective uncertainty measure Π θ is degenerate for all θ, there is a close formal similarity to the model of intertemporal risk aversion. The coefficient describing relative ambiguity aversion can be defined as
Discounting the Future
Following the Stern (2007) review of climate change, few economic parameters have been as hotly debated over the last years as the different contributions to the social discount rate. The social discount rate characterizes in a convenient way how the value of consumption develops over time. It turns out that differing assumptions in social discounting explain the major differences between most integrated assessments of climate change and mitigation policies (Plambeck, Hope & Anderson 1997 , Nordhaus 2007 , Weitzman 2007b . The various contributions to the social discount rate have been considered 14 In Klibanoff et al.'s (2009) axiomatization of the model the parameter space Θ is finite, while in my application I will make it continuous. Note moreover that Klibanoff et al. (2005 Klibanoff et al. ( , 2009 ) setting features acts rather than probability measures on the outcome space.
and discussed extensively in the recent debate, among others, by Nordhaus (2007) , Weitzman (2007b) and Weitzman (2007a) , and Dasgupta (2008b) . A different adjustment stems from limited substitutability between goods under unbalanced growth as it can prevail for produced versus environmental goods (Guesnerie 2004 , Hoel & Sterner 2007 , Traeger 2007d , Sterner & Persson 2008 . After a brief introduction into the debate, this section discusses the contribution of intertemporal risk aversion and ambiguous uncertainty to the social discount rate, two factors neglected in the current debate.
Setting
For the following analysis of social discount rates I assume isoelastic preferences. The choice is based on three reasons. First, a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) in the standard model is a ubiquitous assumption in the social discounting debate. Second, isoelastic preferences in combination with normally distributed uncertainty make the model analytically tractable. Third, for the case of intertemporal risk aversion, isoelasticity allows me to use estimates of intertemporal risk aversion based on the generalized isoelastic model of Epstein & Zin (1989 , 1991 and Weil (1990) . I analyze a model with one aggregate commodity. Within a period utility from certain consumption is described by u(x) = x ρ ρ with ρ ≤ 1, ρ = 0. I am interested in the social discount rate for a stochastic growth scenario. Given some x 1 the model assumes that the consumption growth rate g = ln
is normally distributed with g ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). In section 3.3 the expected growth parameter µ will be known, while in section 3.4 it will be probabilistic (Bayesian prior). The certainty equivalent consumption discount rate is defined as r = ln dx 2 −dx 1 |Ū characterizing a marginal trade-off between the future (dx 2 ) and the present (dx 1 ) that leaves overall welfare unchanged. The pure rate of time preference is δ = ln β. The consumption elasticity of marginal utility becomes η = 1 − ρ.
3.2 Social Discounting, Climate Change, and the Standard Model
The equation characterizing the social discount rate in a standard setting and underlying most of the debate on climate change and discounting is
It is an extension of the classical Ramsey (1928) formula by making growth stochastic. The right hand side of equation (8) characterizes the individual components of the certainty equivalent social discount rate. 15 The first term is the rate of pure time preference δ, which captures impatience and is also known as the utility discount rate. The second term expresses devaluation of future consumption caused by the combination of growth and decreasing marginal utility. The parameter η characterizes the percentage decrease in marginal utility from a percentage increase of consumption. It captures aversion to fluctuations over time and, in the standard model, also with respect to risk. Together with the expected growth rate µ, the term ηµ characterizes the loss of marginal utility from future consumption because of growth. Most of the debate concentrates on the first two terms because the third term generally turns out to be negligible. It characterizes the effect of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion on the certainty equivalent discount rate. The parameter σ characterizes the standard deviation of the (normally distributed) growth rate. The parameters δ, µ, and σ are in the order of percent, while η is in the unit order. Therefore σ 2 easily makes the third term 10 − 100 times smaller than the other two, and risk can be neglected in social discounting. Be aware that σ characterizes risk in the sense of volatility. The frequently met usage of the term risk in the climate change debate, incorporating a reduced expected value as a consequence of possible catastrophic events, would partly be captured by the second term of the social discount rate.
The parameter choices of Stern (2007) can be approximated by δ = 0.1%, η = 1, and µ = 1.3% delivering r = 1.4% under certainty. While Stern's 15 In a complete market without distortions the social discount rate equals the real rate of interest (Ramsey equation). However, incomplete markets, distortions, and long time horizons generally prevent that the social discount rate can be observed easily on the market. Moreover, individuals can have differing valuation in their political role, e.g. valuing future generations' welfare, from the preferences observed on a market where they optimize individual utility. For a closer discussion see Hepburn (2006) . team clearly argues for a normative dimension of these choices, the majority of integrated assessment modelers refuses such a standpoint.
16 For this second group, Nordhaus, creator of the widespread open source integrated assessment model DICE is somewhat representative, adhering to a strictly positive perspective. His parameter choices in the recent version of DICE-2007 (Nordhaus 2008 ) are δ = 1.5%, η = 2, and µ = 2% 17 delivering r = 5.5% (again under certainty). Introducing uncertainty with a standard deviation of σ = 2% to the model would result in an adjustment of the risk free rate by 0.02% in the case of Stern and 0.08% in the case of Nordhaus, both negligible. A standard deviation of σ = 2% is used by Weitzman (2009) to approximate the volatility of economic growth without climate change and possible catastrophic risks. The next section continues the discussion of the effect of uncertainty in the face of climate change. I close with a recent illustration by Nordhaus (2007) on the importance of the social discount rate in climate change evaluation. The author runs the DICE-2007 with both, the Stern (2007) (r = 1.4%) parameterization of the social discount rate and his own (r = 5.5%). These different parameterizations cause a difference in the optimal reduction rate of emissions in the period 2010 − 2019 of 53% versus 14% and a difference in the optimal carbon tax of 360$ versus 35$ per ton C.
The Social Discount Rate under Intertemporal Risk Aversion
This section complements the recent debate on the social discount rate in the face of climate change by incorporating the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. To match the generalized isoelastic model by Epstein & Zin (1989 , 1990 and Weil (1990) I pick intertemporal risk aversion of the isoelastic form
which returns a constant coefficient of relative Arrow Pratt risk aversion of RRA = 1 − α that can be read off from the relation
16 Moreover, Dasgupta (2008a) points out that, from a normative perspective, an egalitarian choice of δ = 0.1% should as well call for a higher propensity of intergenerational consumption smoothing η > 1. 17 The growth rate is endogenous in the DICE model and has been reconstructed from Nordhaus (2007, 694) .
The coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion calculates to
Then, equation (5) turns into
Equation (9) is the 'certain × uncertain' version of Epstein & Zin's (1989 , 1991 infinite horizon recursive utility model. 18 This isoelastic special case of equation (5) is the setting used in the literature to disentangle risk attitude from the propensity to smooth consumption over time.
A more recent estimate of the corresponding preference parameters is Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio (2003), who build on Campbell's (1996) and RRA = 9.5 as a best guess in its ability to match the observed riskless rate and the equity premium. In an overview over different estimates of the above preference parameters (not all based on the simultaneous approach taken in the generalized isoelastic model) Giuliano & Turnovsky (2003) suggest η > 1 18 In a multiperiod framework equation (9) translates into the recursion
To obtain the normalization used by Epstein & Zin (1989 , 1991 , multiply equation (10) by (1 − β)ρ and take both sides to the power of
Expressing the resulting transformation of equation (10) in terms of U * delivers their version
19 The authors have to make assumptions about the covariance of consumption growth and stock returns, the share of stocks in the financial wealth portfolio, the properties of the expected returns to human capital, and the share of human capital in overall wealth. and RRA > 2. All of these papers reject the standard model with its underlying assumption that α = ρ ⇔ RRA = η.
20 The precise estimation of these preference characteristics stays a challenge for econometric analysis, and might also have to be extended beyond the isoelastic special case. ). Subsequently, I will employ two exemplary parameter sets based on Giuliano & Turnovsky's (2003) survey for a 'sensitivity check'.
Proposition 2: The certainty equivalent social discount rate in the isoelastic setting with intertemporal risk aversion is
For a decision maker with positive intertemporal risk aversion RIRA > 0 the value of the random future income stream is reduced. In consequence, an intertemporal risk averse decision maker is willing to invest into certain projects with a relatively lower productivity than a decision maker who bases his decision on the standard model. Now the parameter η only reflects aversion to intertemporal fluctuations. Therefore the term η 2 σ 2 2 should be interpreted as the cost of expected fluctuations triggered by the aversion to non-smooth intertemporal consumption paths. I will still refer to the expression as 'the standard risk term', as it is the only expression capturing risk in an analysis based on the standard model (where η carries a double role). For my parametric best guess based on Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio (2003), the importance of the intertemporal risk aversion term in the social discount rate with respect to the standard risk term is represented by the ratio
The only empirical analysis of the generalizes isoelastic model I am aware of not rejecting the intertemporally additive expected utility special case is Normandin & StAmour (1998) .
A factor of 33 easily brings the importance of risk back into the social discount rate. Note that because of the slightly lower η, the standard risk term in (11) is even lower than in the examples discussed in section 3.2. However, the effect of intertemporal risk aversion is significantly larger. For a numerical example of the terms in equation (11) take again an expected growth rate of µ = 2% and a standard deviation of σ = 2%. Then we find a growth effect of ηµ = 1.3%, a standard risk effect of 0.01%, and an intertemporal risk aversion effect of 0.3%. For example, with a pure rate of time preference of ρ = 1.5% the risk free social discount rate becomes r = 2.5% instead of r = 2.8%. Significant, but not yet a huge difference. Now assume that in the face of climate change risk increases to σ = 4%. Because of the nonlinearity in the risk terms, the risk effects become 0.4% (standard risk term) and 1.2% (intertemporal risk aversion term). The risk effect almost cancels the growth effect. While σ = 4% might be high for a period of one year, it turns out that with time horizons typical to climate change mitigation projects the importance of risk can increase significantly.
Let me extend the distance between present and future to 50 years. Keeping expected growth at 50µ = 50 · 2% = 100% implies that in expectation future wealth in 50 years is x 50 x 0 = exp(1) ≈ 2.7 times current wealth. Let me pick σ = 0.3 implying a probability that climate change (or anything else) causes society to be worse off in 50 years than it is today is approximately 0.04% (that is 0.0004). This choice is somewhat arbitrary, but a very small probability employing a thin tailed probability distribution. Then we find a growth effect of ηµ = 67% and an intertemporal risk aversion effect of 66%. Together with the standard risk term of 2.5%, the risk contribution even more than cancels the growth effect in the social discount rate and I am left more or less with pure time preference discounting. Note that already an increase of the variance to σ = 1 3 , implying that the probability that we are worse off in 50 years as compared to today is approximately 0.13%, makes the negative intertemporal risk aversion term dominate the positive growth term by 15%.
Another point to observe in this numerical example is that even in a scenario without uncertainty the descriptive discount rate derived here is significantly smaller than the values used by Nordhaus. For the one year example we compare r = 2.8% above with Nordhaus' r = 5.5% using the same rate of pure time preference and neglecting uncertainty. That is because Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio's (2003) disentangled estimation of Arrow Pratt risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability reduces their estimate of η and, thus, the growth effect. In an entangled approach to estimating observed preferences part of what is risk aversion RRA is falsely attributed to the aversion to intertemporal fluctuations η overestimating the growth effect and the social discount rate.
While by Nordhaus's (2008) value of η = 2. Keeping RRA = 9.5, which lies clearly in the range suggested by Giuliano & Turnovsky (2003) , reduces the coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion to RIRA = 7.5. In the one year scenario with µ = σ = 2% the growth effect grows back to Nordhaus' 4% and standard and intertemporal risk aversion cut it back by .5%. Increasing the variance to σ = 4% increases the negative risk effect to 2.1%, roughly half of the growth effect. The same is true in the 50 year scenario with σ = .3 where the growth effect becomes 2 in the social discount rate and standard risk aversion respectively intertemporal risk aversion cut it back by .18 respectively 1.
Stacking the deck further against the effects of intertemporal risk aversion let me reduce the Arrow Pratt coefficient to RRA = 5, implying a further reduction of intertemporal risk aversion to RIRA = 3. In the one year scenario with µ = σ = 2% the risk terms cut back less than .3% of the 4% growth term. With the one year σ = 4% scenario as well as in the 50 year scenario the risk terms cut back on the social discount rate by a little more than a quarter of the growth effect (1% and .59 respectively). Note that here the standard risk effect with .18 is of similar order as the intertemporal risk aversion effect with .41, a consequence of the relatively high aversion to intertemporal substitution and the low coefficient of intertemporal risk aversion.
The precise estimation of the parameters η and RRA, respectively RIRA, remains a challenge and the values calculated here are to be taken only as an indicator that we are likely to miss an important contribution to the social discount rate by neglecting intertemporal risk aversion in the intertemporally additive standard model. Table 1 Numerical examples of the social discount rate. Growth rate is 2% per year. η: consumption elasticity of marginal utility, RRA: relative Arrow Pratt risk aversion, RIRA: relative intertemporal risk aversion, grow=ηµ: growth effect, sra=η 2 σ 2 /2: standard risk aversion effect, ira=RIRA 1 − η 2 σ 2 /2: intertemporal risk aversion effect, tra=sra+ira: total risk aversion, sdr=1.5%+grow-sra-ira: social discount rate, where 1.5% is the assumed pure rate of time preference. Numbers rounded to two significant digits and to one decimal digit. η, RRA, and RIRA are measured in percent. grow, sra, ira, sdr are measured in percent only in the 1 year scenarios and in absolute values in the 50 year scenario.
The Social Discount Rate under Ambiguity Aversion
This section derives the effects of ambiguity aversion on social discounting. Weitzman (2009) recently argued that in the context of climate change the parameters of the distribution governing the growth process might not be known. Like Weitzman, I adopt a Bayesian setting to capture such a form of second order uncertainty. While Weitzman sticks with the standard risk evaluation model underlying (8), in contrast, I adopt the ambiguity model by Klibanoff et al. (2005 Klibanoff et al. ( ,2009 ) summarized in equation (7). Taking the simplest example of Bayesian second order uncertainty, I assume that expected growth is itself a normally distributed parameter θ with expectation µ and variance τ 2 . Formally that is E(g|θ) ∼ N (θ, σ 2 ) and θ ∼ N (µ, τ 2 ), preserving the interpretation of µ as characterizing the overall expectation of the growth trend. For a given realization of θ the standard deviation of the growth process stays a known parameter θ as in the previous model. Moreover, I assume isoelasticity of ambiguity aversion Φ(z) = (ρz) ϕ yielding a constant coefficient of relative ambiguity aversion
Under the assumptions summarized in section 3.1 the appendix derives the corresponding social discount rate.
Proposition 3: The certainty equivalent social discount rate in the above 2 period setting with constant relative ambiguity aversion and isoelastic utility is
The first two terms reflect once more the discount rate as in the standard Ramsey equation under certainty, the third term −η 2 σ 2 +τ 2 2 reflects the well known extension for risk, and the third term replaces the intertemporal risk aversion term and, here, is caused by ambiguity aversion. This new term reduces the certainty equivalent consumption discount rate and is proportional to relative ambiguity aversion and to second order variance τ 2 . Under ambiguity, the decision maker is willing to invest into certain projects with relatively lower productivity than is a decision maker who is ambiguity neutral or just faces (first order) risk. In contrast to the model of intertemporal risk aversion, the consumption discount rate is only reduced for second order uncertainty (τ 2 ), not for objective first order risk (σ 2 ). Relating my results to Weitzman (2009) let me ignore ambiguity aversion and the term containing RAA. The only difference between the remaining part of equation (12) and the standard equation (8) is the additional variance τ in the third term on the right hand side (standard risk term). It is a straight forward consequence of making the growth process more uncertain by introducing a prior (second order uncertainty) over some parameter of the growth process. In the case of the normal distributions adopted here, the variance simply adds up. From the given example, it is hard to see how adding a Bayesian prior would bring the standard risk term back into the order of magnitude needed to compare to the other characterizing terms of the social discount rate. Instead of a doubling, a factor of 10 − 100 is needed. The only way to reach this result is by sufficiently increasing the variance of the prior. Effectively, this is what Weitzman (2009) does in deriving what he calls a dismal theorem. He introduces a fat tailed ignorant prior whose higher moments do not exist. In consequence, the risk free social discount rate in equation (12) goes to minus infinity implying an infinite willingness to transfer (certain) consumption into the future. Weitzman limits this willingness by the value of a (or society's) statistical life.
21 Instead of messing with infinity, the above proposition follows the more humble approach of introducing ambiguity aversion, i.e. the term RAA |1 − η 2 | τ 2 2
, into social discounting, reflecting experimental evidence that economic agents tend to be more afraid of unknown probabilities than they are of known probabilities (most famously Ellsberg 1961) . Unfortunately, I
am not yet aware of estimates for the parameter RAA in the Klibanoff et al. model. It will be interesting whether ambiguity aversion can bring uncertainty back into the social discounting debate as well.
Conclusions
Environmental and resource economics is largely an economics of long time horizons and uncertainty. This fact is crucial to almost any aspect of the climate change problem and just as important in more traditional problems like the cost benefit analysis of biodiversity conservation. The recent discussion of the Stern review on climate policy has put a spotlight on a particularly important aspect of intertemporal evaluation: the social discount rate. Thereby, most of the discussion is framed in a standard discounted expected utility setting. I have pointed out limitations of the standard model and complemented the discussion by deriving two new contributions to the social discount rate that had been overlooked in the debate. One such contribution stems from the fact that the intertemporally additive expected utility model contains an implicit assumption of risk neutrality and the other contribution stems from additional aversion against ambiguous uncertainty.
In 'certain×uncertain' setting I develop a simplified characterization of intertemporal risk aversion, characterizing the type of risk aversion that is missing in the standard model. I show analytically how in a comprehensive framework the social discount rate is reduced by a term proportional to intertemporal risk aversion. In a second extension of the standard model I account for aversion to ambiguity, or aversion to 'uncertainty about the correct probabilities'. Again, I analytically derive a term that reduces the social discount rate in the more comprehensive model. I find that the term is proportional to relative ambiguity aversion and identical in structure to the term translating intertemporal risk aversion into the social discount rate.
I use estimates of Epstein & Zin's (1989) and Weil's (1990) generalized isoelastic model to analyze the quantitative importance of intertemporal risk aversion in the social discount rate. I find that under intertemporal risk aversion the influence of risk (volatility), which is negligible in the standard model, comes back into the same order of magnitude as the much discussed values for growth discounting and pure time preference. Based on a best guess by Vissing-Jørgensen & Attanasio (2003) I show that, under moderate assumptions about climate risk, the risk contribution to social discounting can quantitatively cancel the growth contribution. Then, the social discount rate coincides with pure time preference. Analyzing the contribution of two other guesstimates yielding lower coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion, I still find that the contribution to the social discount rate is significant and should not be neglected. A different insight is that the ability of the model to disentangle attitude with respect to time and with respect to risk tends to lower the growth contribution to social discounting. The reason is that in the standard model willingness to smooth consumption over time is overestimated as it is described by the same coefficient that has to capture (the generally higher) Arrow Pratt risk aversion. Both effects reduce the certainty equivalent discount rate. In consequence, projects should be carried out that in a cost benefit analysis based on the standard model would be discounted into inefficiency.
While a reliable quantification of the contributions derived in this paper is yet to be obtained, the theoretical insights should be kept in mind when formulating long-term policies, in particular, if they involve a trade of between long-run, high uncertainty scenarios versus scenarios promising a more stable development, e.g. of our current climate. A crucial aspect of the climate change problem is that we are learning at a fast speed over the consequences, the technical mitigation possibilities, and at least some of the economic uncertainties involved in climate change. Thus, an important extension of the model will be the incorporation of an arbitrary time horizon in combination with the anticipation of learning.
Combining equations (13) and (14) returns
which for an increasing [decreasing] version of f is equivalent to
Defining z i = u(x i ) the equation becomes
Because preferences are assumed to be representable in the form (5), there exists a certainty equivalentx to all lotteries 1 2
x 2 with x 1 , x 2 ∈ X. Takingx to be the certainty equivalent, the premise and thus equation (16) has to hold for all z 1 , z 2 ∈ u(X). Therefore, f has to be concave [convex] on U (x) (Hardy et al. 1964, 75) . Necessity of axiom (6): The necessity is seen to hold by going backwards through the proof of sufficiency above. Strict concavity [convexity] of f with f increasing [decreasing] implies that equation (16) and, thus, equation (15) have to hold for z 1 , z 2 ∈ u(X). The premise corresponding to (13) guarantees that equation (15) implies equation (14) which yields the implication in condition (6). Replacing ' ' by ' ' and '≥' by '≤' in the proof above implies that the decision maker is intertemporal risk averse, if and only if, f is convex [for an increasing version of f , and concave for f decreasing]. b) The decision maker is intertemporal risk neutral, if and only if, f is concave and convex on u(X), which is equivalent to f being linear.
22 However, a linear function f cancels out in representation (5) and makes it identical to the intertemporally additive expected utility standard representation (1).
Proof of proposition 2:
The proof calculates the marginal value of an additional certain unit of consumption in the second period (dx 2 ) in terms 
